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INTRODUCTION
Although  there has been  a considerable  amount  of legislation  aimed  at marital  rights  in several
countries  in recent decades,  the implications  for women's  labour supply  has been  a comparatively
neglected  area. In this report,  we use insights  from  the economics  of marriage,  including
bargaining  theories,  to examine  the labour-market  impact  of legislation  covering  marital  and post-
marital  support obligations,  which  include  child  support  and pension  splitting.  The focus will  be
on generic  forms of such  legislative  change  with illustrations  drawn  from recent  UK legislative
change.  The approach  is drawn  from the economics  of law (Posner [1992a]).
Labour  supply  is mostly  interpreted  as hours  worked.  However,  the participation  rate for women
is affected  in the framework  used if women are moved  from 'corner  solutions'  where  they either
do not work at all or possibly  where they  were working  but then stop. It is not very useful  to
distinguish  hours worked  from  the decision  whether  or not to work at all  given  the concerns  of
this paper.
The structure  of the paper is as follows.  We examine  the economic  theory  of marriage,  focusing
on individual-bargaining  theoretical  approaches.  To some  extent,  the resulting  behaviour  indicated
by individual  bargaining  models  of marriage  can  be easily  fitted into standard  labour-market
modelling  of labour supply  decisions.  We then move  on to examine  policy  towards  alimony,  child
support,  property division,  and pension  splitting.  The  topics are chosen  to reflect  important
current  trends in marital  law  in developed  countries  that seem  likely  to spread  towards developing
countries.
1.  THE ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE
There  is a significant  body of economic  analysis  that regards  marriage  as the result  of rational
purposeful  behaviour,  with the parties seeking  gains  from trade in much  the way that business
partnerships  operate. These  gains  are a mixture  of financial  and other, typically  psychic,  benefits
and costs. It should  emphatically  not be thought  that economic  analysis  is confined  to pecuniary
issues.
1.1.  Some Theory
The literature  begins  with Samuelson's  [1956]  rationalization  of family  behaviour  as the result  of
maximizing  a single  preference  function.  Each family  member  has a set of preferences  over the
goods  that the family  can provide  or activities  in which  it can engage.  By consensus,  they agree  to
pursue  common  goals: technically  they seek  to maximize  a consensus  social  welfare  function  that
applies  a set of weights  to the preferences  of individual  members  of the family.  The point ofthis formulation of the family is actually to allow the application of standard consumer theory to
household expenditure decisions. Samuelson gave no explanation either of the process of reaching
consensus or of how family members came together or moved apart.
Becker [1974; 1991] is considered to be a pioneer among economic theorists of marriage. In fact
it would surprise many to learn that Becker's model of the family is imbued with considerable
altruistic elements. Marriage is seen as the culmination of a search and matching process, which
establishes a household production function allowing efficient division  of labour to take place and,
in particular, delivering marital public goods like children. Divorce, if legally  permitted, results
from search in a remarriage market and is therefore a result of inefficient  first-partner searching
(Becker et al [1977]1). Becker's [1991] model of the family is altruistic rather than consensual: a
group of selfish rational family members and an altruistic head of family  who adjusts intra-familial
transfers so that the selfish members work to maximize family welfare.
Carbone & Brinig [1991] have commented that Becker is a traditionalist, who sees marriage in
terms of an exchange of domestic services, typically  by the female, in exchange for long-term
financial support.  Marital output comprises marital public goods like children or other shared
aspects of lifestyle, as well as private benefits for the parties.  There is generally some 'surplus', i.e.
a set of net benefits, that must be divided between the parties in a marriage. Also, note that many
of the 'investments' (e.g. time spent raising children) are long term in nature and marriage specific
(i.e. sunk costs - they cannot be recouped later). Becker's view of marriage  would raise major
concerns in relation to legal environments that allow easy divorce without tying post-divorce
support obligations to findings of substantial breach of contract. In particular, if husbands can
abandon wives easily there may be poor incentives  for investment (by the wife) in domestic
production, which, from a different angle, may encourage labour-market participation by the wife.
Both Samuelson and Becker provide a common-preference view of the family that is useful for
integrating the family into the standard economic analysis of consumption. However, the
common-preference approach gives a limited starting point for the study of marriage and, in
particular, of the impact of legislation covering divorce or marriage. In recent years, economists
have increasingly focused on bargaining models of marriage and divorce. These give powerful
insights into modern labour-market and marital issues and generate a series of useful testable
hypotheses.
To this end it is useful to take a brief look at recent work on intra-household bargaining
(Lundberg & Pollak [  1996]). The broad conclusion of this game-theoretic work is that the
household does not operate as a consensual unit, e.g. alteration of the economic conditions facing
one partner,  including the rules of divorce, will alter the pattern of expenditure  within a family.
Thus, a consensual view of the family may be as outmoded as a pre-public-choice, public-interest
(rather than interest-group) view of government (Mueller [1989]). Econometric work (Lundberg
et al [1995]) on the impact of welfare reforms that increase the share of family income going to
the mother shows statistically significant shifts  towards mother or child orientated expenditures,
which is consistent with a 'separate-spheres' model of marriage and the attitude of aid agencies
(World Bank [1995]). Similar work shows a reduction in female labour supply as a response to
increases in transfers from males (Fortin and Lacroix [1997] at 953). In such models, the parties
2bargain to a cooperative outcome from a non-cooperative threat point based on their own wealth
from more independent alternatives, which might include increased labour-market participation or
a non-cooperative marriage as possible altematives to divorce.
An alternative bargaining  model uses a divorce threat point as the non-cooperative alternative.  An
important general prediction from bargaining models is that changes in the initial endowments of
parties, through divorce support laws in the divorce-threat model, or in tax and welfare
regulations in the separate-spheres model, feed back to alter the allocations of joint income within
marriage and the allocation of both parties' time between labour-market and domestic inputs. In
examining policy towards marriage and divorce support obligations, it is possible to take a mixed
view in which the divorce threat point or a separate-spheres threat point (in a non-cooperative but
nonetheless continuing marriage) may be affected with consequences for labour-market
participation and expenditure decisions.  We may call such models 'individual-bargaining'  models
of marriage.
We may also interpret (economic-) sociological analysis that notes the extent to which female
labour patterns have changed in the twentieth century (Hudson & Lee [1990]) or that observes
the variation in responsibilities  for decision making across social classes (Pahl [1989]) as implying
shifting bargaining boundaries. It would be difficult to support the notion of one model of the
marriage contract that remains relatively stationary over time. It is also clear that legislative
changes impact upon bargaining threat points and are likely to have significant effects on the
desire on the part of women to enter the labour market.
Before moving on to specific policy areas, it is worth outlining Lloyd Cohen's [1987] economic
analysis of marriage, which is linked to the modern economic analysis  of  long-term contracting
and problems of opportunistic behaviour. Legislation towards marriage and the family can
inadvertently set up incentives for opportunistic behaviour that might deter marriage and enhance
labour-market participation by women.  Cohen [1987] describes marriage as an unusual contract
with the major feature that the parties exchange promises of spousal support, where the value of
the support is crucially  dependent on the attitude with which they are delivered. In a typical
traditional marriage, many of the domestic services provided by the wife occur early in the
marriage, whereas the support offered by the male will grow in value over the longer term as his
career develops. Over time, the opportunities of the parties may change so that one of them has
an incentive to breach the contract. Marriages that end in divorce impose costs on both parties,
equal to at least the cost of finding a replacement spouse of equivalent value.  Cohen [1987 at
278] argues that the risks and costs of being an unwilling party to divorce are asymmetrically
distributed: the husband might be tempted to take the wife's early services and dump her to enjoy
his later high income without her (the 'greener-grass' effect), and she will tend to be worth less on
the remarriage market than a male of similar age.
Why then do people marry? There are both psychic and instrumental  benefits to marriage. The
willingness of someone to commit themselves to oneself is evidence of worthiness of such love.
On the instrumental side, marriage gives a means of protecting long-term investments in marital
assets: according to Cohen [1987 at 269] the spouses may be regarded as 'unique capital inputs in
the production of a new capital asset, namely "the family".' In particular, children are highly
3valued marital public goods. Another instrumental gain is the provision of insurance: parties give
up their freedom to seek new partners if their prospects improve for a similar commitment  from a
spouse, which is rational if the gains from marriage exceed the cost of losing freedom to separate
(see also Posner [1  992b]). The gains from marriage reflect surpluses over costs which can be seen
as appropriable 'quasi-rents' that may tempt a spouse to opportunistic behaviour, comparable to
the incentives in more regular long-term contracts (Klein et al [1978]).  Cohen also draws
attention to the role of willingness to incur sunk costs like the effort expended on raising children,
or the prospect of losing association with one's children, as hostages that may suppress
opportunistic exit from the marriage - comparable to the offsetting vulnerability often designed
into commercial  contracts as hostages (Williamson [19853).
Cohen [1987] favours the preservation of restraints on opportunistic divorce, which he sees as a
question of understanding that marriage is essentially a long-term contractual relationship. The
'wrong'-judicial  approach to marital obligations like long-term support for breached-against
spouses can lead to too much or too little divorce. I note that this observation brings in the idea of
an optimal level of divorce, which might be encapsulated in a rule like 'let them divorce when the
breaching party (the one who wants to leave, or who has committed a 'marital offence') can
compensate the victim of breach.' I pursue the idea of optimal breach further below. Cohen does
not believe that any system of obligation (party-designed damages, mutual-consent divorce,
indissoluble  marriage, or court-determined awards) will perfectly preserve marital surpluses for
redistribution. Party-designed damages would be difficult  to enforce. Mutual-consent divorce
might be thought a perfect solution because to obtain consent a party will have to preserve the
other spouse's expected net benefits: but unfortunately the default position of the status quo could
not be enforced to give this impetus. Indissoluble marriage would stop efficient divorce (breacher
gains more than the victim loses and compensates him or her). The problem with court
intervention is less severe, according to Cohen [1987 at 303], as courts could protect the party's
expected net benefits (expectation) from marriage - although this is 'much easier to say than to
do'. Courts would need to determnine  who breached and what is the loss to the non-breaching
party.
Carbone and Brinig [1991] point out that Cohen reaches essentially  traditionalist conclusions  from
a different perspective (protecting victims of opportunistic breach) than Becker (ensuring inputs
are directed to domestic services in family 'production' units). Traditionalist conclusions are not
necessarily implied  by a contractual focus based on preserving  expectation.
Taking these mostly theoretical observations together, a contractual view of marriage requires the
underlying view of contract to be quite sophisticated. Marriage contracts  revolve around direct
and instrumental benefits, bargaining influences, public goods, long-term and often sunk
investments, incentives for due performance and incentives for opportunism. These factors are of
considerable consequence. If the law covering the financial obligations attached to divorce fails to
suppress opportunism, for example,  then fewer marriages will occur than otherwise, or there may
be less investment  in marriage-specific assets like child raising,  because people will not be certain
of obtaining acceptable returns on their marriage-specific investments. Thus, we might find
considerable erosion of trust between potential spouses and women inclining more towards
preserving their worth on the labour market. A general drift away from husbands' life-time
4support obligations towards wives, such as has occurred in many developed countries and may be
seen as a part of the modernization of developing countries, can be predicted to lead women to
insure themselves through greater labour-market participation.
1.2.  Lahour Supply
An implication of individual-bargaining  models of marriage is that changes in regulations or laws
will shift income from one spouse, or former spouse, to the other. This can be fitted into
conventional labour-market analysis as a change in unearned income as shown in Figure 1., which
illustrates an individual's  labour-supply decision.
Figure 1. Labour Supply
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The individual's  indifference curves between working time (t) and earnings are shown in Figure 1.
The curves (U1 and U2) show combinations of working time and wage between which the
individual is indifferent,  and the convex-from-below shape shows a requirement for the wage rate
to increase to bring forth more hours of work. The curve U2 is everywhere above Ul  showing
that higher income for the same work is always a preferred position. The maximum hours that
can be worked are shown by the vertical line T. The straight line between point C and point E
shows a particular wage rate, with the intercept (C) showing a level of unearned income. Starting
at C and given the wage rate, the individual attains the highest indifference curve (level of
welfare) at point A by working tI  hours.  If unearned income increases from C to D, the wage line
moves up parallel  to itself to the position connecting points D and B.  In that case the individual
reduces hours worked to t2.
The prediction to be used throughout this paper is that increases in unearned income will reduce
hours of work. This is a reasonable result and rests on the reasonable assumption that labour-
supply indifference  curves become steeper as they shift upwards. The assumption is supported by
the empirical work reporting that women reduce their labour supply following increased income
transfers from males (Fortin and Lacroix [1997] at 953]). Many regulatory changes affecting
married or divorced couples can be seen in this fashion as transferring income from the male to
the female, for whom it has the incentive properties of unearned income.
Note that corner solutions are possible. If the curves become WUU  and  WU2,  the transfer of CD
has no effect on labour-market participation - it is just a windfall.  If corner solutions existed at
5points like F or G, there might also be no change following a transfer as the individual  is could be
locked into working all the time (T allows for some sleep!).
This concludes our theoretical review. Broadly, standard labour-supply analysis  may be used once
it is realized that legislation shifts  income between individually  motivated marital partners (or ex-
spouses).  It is also important to recognize possibilities for opportunism based around marital and
post-marital obligations.
2.  THlE  MOVE  FROM  LIFE-TIME  SUPPORT  OBLIGATIONS
In developed countries, there has been much movement away from laws creating life-time support
obligation towards wives, either affecting husbands during marriage or, in particular, after divorce
has occurred. There is the possibility  that modernization of laws in developing countries might
follow the same movement. Eroding the life-time support obligation can be shown to alter the
relative attractiveness of domestic work relative to labour market participation for women.
The law in England up to  1984 gives a good example of life-time support obligations. Section 25
of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 required courts to:'...  place the parties, so far as is it is
practicable and, having regard to their conduct, just to do so, in the financial position in which
they would have been if the marriage had not broken down. 'The operation of Section 25 of the
1973 Act (effectively abolished in favour of a fully discretionary approach in 1984) was influenced
by the conmmon-law  duty of a husband to financially support his ex-wife, typically at the rate
commensurate with providing one-third ofjoint income, as in Wachtel v. Wachtel. That influence
may be traced (Carbone and Brinig [1991]) to the origins of marriage as a pre-contract-law, status
relationship,  with support rates for wives based on the treatment of widows (i.e. dower
principles). It seems to have implied that a wife's expectation from a joint lifestyle  was less than
her husband's.  Lord Denning MR said in Wachtel 'There was ... much good sense in taking one-
third as a starting point. ... there will be two households instead of one. The husband must go out
to work ... and must get some woman to look after the house - either a wife ... or a housekeeper
... He will also have to provide maintenance for the children. The wife will usually not have so
much expense. She may go out to work ... but she will not usually employ a housekeeper [but]
will do most of the housework herself...  She may remarry, in which case her new husband will
provide for her. In any case ... the greater expense will, in most cases, fall on the husband.
Some of Lord Denning's comments are consistent with a contractual view of marriage
emphasizing  expectation damages (remarriage, the benefit spilling over to the child-caring  wife
from child maintenance) but some are not (she can do her own housework but he cannot).
Generally though, the point to note is that the life-time obligation did not significantly  incorporate
fault into the award of support: unless a former wife's behaviour was regarded as egregiously bad,
she would typically obtain alimony.  We follow this convention in not relating alimony obligations
to fault in the analysis of this paper.
The modem  development of divorce law increasingly emphasizes the 'rehabilitation' and
independence  of abandoned spouses. The Law Commission  [1982] came to the conclusion that
the 1973 Act's imposition of a duty to place the parties in the position they would have been had
6the marriage  not broken down  was 'not a suitable  criterion',  based largely  on a perceived
movement  in public  opinion  against  the idea of life-time  support. This movement  in opinion  has
probably  occurred  in many  countries  by now and much  legal  reform  has incorporated  it. The
approaches  that have  typically  been  introduced  are based  on broadly  three ideas: opportunity  cost,
rehabilitation  and partnership.  At this stage we consider  alimony-style,  periodical  payments,
examining  property division  in a later section.
2.1  Opportunity  Cost
In his book The Limits  of Freedom  of Contract, Michael  Trebilcock [1993]  identifies  a dilemma
in modem  divorce laws. The dilemma  is that divorce  laws  that are protective  of women in terms
of maintenance  and capital  provisions  legitimize  the subordinate  role of women in society,
whereas  treating  the divorcing  couple  as equals  ignores  the disadvantages  that specialization  in
domestic  production  confers  in the outside  labour  market  on many  divorcing  women.  The
dilemma  is well-rehearsed  in Duclos [1987]  and Smart  [1984].
Duclos  [1987] argues  that we should  approach  the valuation  of marital  assets  upon divorce  by
compensating  the abandoned  spouse  (usually  the woman)  or the woman  choosing  to leave  the
marriage,  for the opportunity  cost of entering  the marriage.  The opportunity  cost comprises  the
value  of whatever  alternative  prospects  she gave up and may  be described  as a 'reliance'  standard
in the terminology  of legal scholarship:  the opportunity  cost has become  akin  to wasted
expenditure  and the suggested  rule seeks  to put her in the position  she would  have  been in had the
marriage  never taken place  (the status  quo ante). In this report we focus on the impact  of this
approach  for the abandoned  spouse's  labour-supply  decisions.  Duclos particularly  draws attention
to the loss of career  opportunities  for many  women  either  on entering  marriage  or in stopping
work  to have children.  Note however  that an economically  strong  woman  leaving a marriage
might  receive  nothing  under  this  approach,  if she could  be shown  to have  lost nothing  through
marriage.
The court would be required  to examine  and adjust  the property rights  of the divorcing  spouses  to
put the divorcing  woman in the financial  position  she could  claim  marriage  prevented  her from
attaining. The suggested  operation  of this standard  is not strictly  equivalent  to the use of reliance
damages,  as these might  be used  in the law of contract  (when  this occurs)  or in tort, because  there
is no suggestion  that the alimony  payments  should  be linked  to breach  of contract:  the adjustment
is usually  simply  to be made for the benefit  of an economically  weakened  divorcing  woman.
Equally,  there is no reason  in principle  why reliance  damages  could not be linked  to breach  of
contract,  either in the sense  of marital  offences  (substantial  breach) or simply  as a decision  by one
party  to leave  the marriage. The court would  transfer  income  between  the ex-spouses  to achieve
the required  adjustment.
Trebilcock  [1993, at 45] points  out that an immediate  problem  is that the reliance  approach  is
harsh  in its treatment of divorcing  women  who had  poor career prospects  before marriage,  i.e. the
case  of the waitress  who at nineteen  marries  a millionaire.  Such cases  would  receive  very little
compensation  for marital  breakdown. This realization  lies  behind  Baker's  [1988]  proposal  to
award  a proportion of the husband's  earnings  over  the duration  of the marriage  to wives who
7specialized early on in domestic production. Trebilcock, following Cohen [1987], correctly
criticizes this suggestion for ignoring the time profile of returns in such relationships: the wife
typically invests early in domestic production and anticipates that many of the returns will come
later in the marriage, as when her husband's freedom to concentrate on his career leads to high
late-career earnings and pension entitlements. Nonetheless, reliance does have its supporters
among economics of law practitioners, notably in the valuation of the loss of a housewife's
services in fatal-accident cases (Knetch [1984]) and, among traditionalists, in establishing an
incentive to induce female investment in household production (Becker [1991]; Landes [1978]).
The reliance approach was rejected by the Law Commission in England as requiring too much
speculation about what might have been but does find its way into case arguments, sometimes in
confusion with the restitution standard that we discuss  below.
We now examine the incentives for marital investments, which mirrors the incentive for labour-
market participation, created by opportunity-cost based standards of post-marital support.
Incentives for investments in domestic services  would be preserved. A woman contemplating
marriage-specific investments in child care by giving  up labour-market opportunities, for example,
is better off in the marriage with those investments and is at least as well off if it all goes wrong
because she receives her opportunity cost (reliance) as compensation. Therefore, the incentive
remains for traditional marriages in which the woman exchanges domestic services for long-term
support. The reliance approach could therefore easily support a public-policy objective of
preserving traditional family life-styles, rather than encouraging women into work, which may not
be appreciated by some of its supporters.
It follows that reliance-based systems of post-marital support cannot be used to encourage
women into the labour market by their avoiding child rearing during early periods of their lives.
The policy is neutral with respect to the incentive to bear children. However, there will be more
indirect incentives to enter the labour market alongside child rearing.
The reliance approach provides a longer-term incentive for labour-market participation, beyond
the early years of marriage. This is because it does not require the full marital expectations of a
divorcing woman to be met upon her divorce. She is in a sense to be short changed if leaving a
wealthy marriage, assuming that her opportunity cost was lower than her expected income on
entering the marriage. She will therefore have an incentive to enter the labour market to earn
money to make up this shortfall following divorce. This incentive is reinforced by divorce laws
that make allowance for the fact that the woman can work, as though placing her under a duty to
mitigate her losses. In terms of Figure 1, it is as though the operation of the law took away a
portion of unearned income, which can be expected to result in an increase in hours worked.
The same 'short changing' will create an incentive  for husbands to opportunistically divorce wives,
compared with life-time support obligations. This is especially true where there is a sudden move
from life-time to more qualified support obligations from husbands to (ex-)wives. The husband
may find it attractive to divorce when he would not if faced with life-time obligations, which may
be referred to as the 'greener-grass' effect (Dnes [1997] and [ 1998]). The reduction in trust in
marriage likely to follow in such situations may well cause women to participate in labour markets
before and during marriage as an insurance policy. Marriage would simply be worth less and
8would be a riskier proposition to women, who would, in terms of Figure 1. feel that their
expected unearned income had fallen and increase their labour supply to increase personally
controlled income during marriage.
2.2. - Restitution
Carbone and  Brinig ([1991] at 996) identify a modem development in divorce law that they
describe as a restitution approach. In a US context, they argue that academic analysis (Krauskopf
[1980] & [1989]; Carbone [1990]; O'Connell [1988]) has been led by developments in the courts,
which have increasingly emphasized settlements that repay lost career opportunities, particularly
in the context of  a wife's domestic support of her husband and children during periods that
allowed for the development of business capital, and other contributions to a spouse's career. One
can detect restitution elements in English case law, e.g. Gojkovic v. Gojkovic (1992), as §25(f) of
the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984  draws attention to the value of a contribution
of domestic services. In the neighbouring jurisdiction, The Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 is
explicit in requiring 'fair account' to be taken of the economic disadvantage suffered by one party
in the interests of the welfare of the family.
One example where restitution might be considered appropriate would be when a wife supports
her husband through college: if they later divorce, the question is whether it is right that he should
keep all the returns on this human-capital investment. The canonical example would be where the
wife undertakes the child care so that her husband can develop his professional or business life.
Restitution is often cited as an appropriate remedy in contract law when not returning money paid
out by the victim of breach would lead to unjust enrichment of the breaching party (Farnsworth
[1990 at 946]). Restitution is ideologically  acceptable to cultural feminists  who wish to emphasize
that repayment of sacrifices is owed and that alimony and capital provision should not treat
women paternalistically.
A restitution approach is distinct from a reliance approach, although both often emphasize  the
same life choices, e.g. the opportunity forgone for a separate career. Under a restitution approach,
compensation is in the form of a share in the market gain supported by the wife's (or possibly
husband's) supportive career choice, e.g. a share in the returns to a medical degree, or a share of
the business - where both were the result of the other spouse's adopting primary child-care
responsibility. Restitution is therefore only possible where measurable market gains have resulted
from the 'sacrifice'. The reliance approach, in contrast, is based on measuring the value of the
opportunity forgone, e.g. estimating retrospectively the value of continuing with a career instead
of leaving work to raise children.
Restitution is kinder to divorcing women who had poor career prospects before entering the
marriage. Indeed, interest in the standard may have been induced by awareness that divorce
settlements in the US have tended to disadvantage women and children (Weitzman [1985]).
Similar findings have been published in the UK (Eekelaar & Maclean [1986]; Bradshaw & Millar
[1991]).
9A restitution standard for alimony has many logical similarities  to a reliance standard. There will
be more divorce compared with lifetime-support obligations and the higher level of opportunistic
divorce (the greener-grass effect) will be to the disadvantage of women. The resulting risk in
marriage retums to the female will encourage her to work before and during marriage as one
possible piece of self insurance.  She may need to work after divorce as the restitution standard of
alimony will be less generous than life-time support obligations, assuming lifetime support at the
married standard of living to be likely to consume some of the husband's 'property rights' in joint
marital investments in human and business capital. However, restitution also preserves the
incentive for investment in child rearing as the (market) value of opportunities forgone are
required to be repaid, so there will be no direct incentives to join the labour market as a result of
avoiding child rearing.
Compared with reliance damages, the level of divorce, and the incentive for females to enter the
labour market,  could be higher or lower under a restitution standard. This is because there is no
necessary connection between the value of investment in the other spouse's career and a person's
own alternative career prospects. All that is required to attract the person into the marriage is that
the net benefit (returns minus investment) be higher than the net returns in the alternative career.
For a given alternative career, the requirement is met with high returns to marriage and high
investment, or low returns and low investments. Anyway, some of the returns to the person from
marriage may be in the form of transfers from the other spouse. Therefore, reliance can be greater
or less than restitution.
2.  3  Needs-BasedAlimony  and Rehabilitation'
A focus on meeting post-divorce housing and other needs, particularly of the spouse with
childcare responsibilities, is the dominant element operating in the current English law on post-
divorce financial  responsibilities. Need is the starting point, albeit qualified by the social standing
of a couple under the rubric 'reasonable  needs of the wife', and the majority of cases do not reveal
sufficient family resources to go much beyond the housing and basic needs of the divorced wife
and the children of the marriage.
The employment consequences of the standard are different from the restitution and reliance
standards. If we assume that meeting need is a minimal expectation in marriage, needs-based
alimony awards would be less than payments under a life-time support obligation (which would be
linked to expectations of marital living standards) or under restitution and reliance standards, and
higher levels of divorce would occur. The by now familiar  greener-grass effect would be
intensified and women would tend to work more in labour markets to make up for lost marital
income and to protect themselves from the risk of divorce.
Sometimes a needs-based approach to alimony expressly seeks to support a divorced wife until
she can reestablish herself in the labour market.  In England, the principle of rehabilitation  crops
up in the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, which added a requirement to the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (§25A[2]) to consider whether alimony payments might be
temporary and last just long enough to help a party adjust to the end of financial dependency.
10Rehabilitative alimony features in US cases and is an important element of the Scottish system of
divorce law.
The needs-based approach will clearly act to direct women into the labour market, but, as a direct
incentive, only after divorce. It is simply the case that they will have to work (or possibly draw
welfare payments) after the rehabilitative alimony ends, as, in terms of Figure 1., they lose
unearned income. However, as in all the case of all the standards considered so far, rehabilitative
alimony will be a low-cost obligation compared with life-time support and will encourage some
opportunistic husbands to divorce. Women will therefore insure themselves partly by maintaining
labour-market participation at earlier stages before and during marriage.
2.4  Child Support  Initiatives  and  Agencies
Several countries have reformed their systems of child welfare by enforcing the payment of child
support by absent parents.  Such systems are now well established in the USA, Australia, the
United Kingdom and across continental Europe. The absent parent is typically the male so that
child support obligations have the characteristic of transferring income from males to females,
with definite implications for female labour supply as the transfer has the effect of increasing
unearned income in terms of Figure 1. To the extent that developing countries lack developed
social-welfare systems and become subject to trends towards single parenting, child-support
legislation is likely to increasingly  arise in such countries.
In the United Kingdom, support of children is now covered by the Child Support Act 1991, under
which the Child Support Agency (CSA) uses a formula to deduct support payments from absent
parents and transfer the money to the parent with care of the children of the marriage.  CSA
action to obtain child support payments from absent parents is mandatory when the care-giving
parent claims income support, which has come into conflict  with the clean-break principle in
divorce, under which courts have awarded transfers of property in place of periodical payments as
in Smith  & Mclnerney.  The Courts appear to be beginning to recognize the danger of double
counting payments of capital and income when the CSA imposes a payment order on a pre-1991
case. An implication is that parents with care might receive windfall gains at the start of a CSA-
type policy.
Econometric work (Lundberg et al [1995]) on the impact of welfare reforms that increase the
share of family income going to the mother shows statistically  significant shifts towards mother or
child orientated expenditures, which is consistent with a 'separate-spheres' model of marriage and
with a reduction in labour-market participation for women.  Introducing a CSA-type policy in
which absent fathers are required to increase significantly  their support of children may be seen as
an exact duplicate of the welfare reforms studied by Lundberg et al [1995] - which referred to the
introduction of child benefit payments to mothers at the expense of tax benefits to fathers in the
UK in the 1970s. A straightforward prediction would be that the incentive to work for mothers
with absent partners would be reduced, particularly  as the own-wage elasticity of labour supply
for women has been shown to increase when intra-household  transfers are taken into account
(Fortin and Lacroix [1997]).
11However, care needs to be taken in drawing policy conclusion from the above theoretical and
empirical observations.  The Child Support Act in the UK had the effect of greatly increasing
payments to mothers, including  a part (£48 per week) directly aimed at supporting the mother as
principal  carer of the child. The £48 exactly matched  the amount that would be paid to an
'abandoned'  woman claiming  Social Security. Thus, if the CSA payment otherwise reflected the
costs of caring for children, and the woman received an amount equal to a social-security payment
that would consequently disappear, there might be no effect on incentives (as though the wage
line shifted  up and down by the same amount in Figure 1). In fact, in the UK, this was unlikely to
be the case as the amount paid for support of children was very generous compared with either
social security rates for children or the amounts that would be awarded for child care by civil
courts.  Nonetheless, much depends on the design of the CSA-type system: it could be neutral if
providing  just enough for child care, or if substituting for other payments.
A final  important point about CSA-type systems is that they apply to child care not to marriage.
Mothers with illegitimate children  are perfectly entitled to make claims in the UK, USA and
Australia.  Such systems are likely to provide income transfers between men and women more
generally, as well as between divorced couples.
3.  MOVES TOWARDS COMMUNITY-PROPERTY LAWS IN MARRIAGE
Continuing  with the analysis of legislative changes affecting marital and post-marital support
obligations, rules of property division need to be considered as these affect individual gender-
divided levels of wealth. The developed world either follows rules of commnunity  property, e.g. a
presumption of equal shares in marital property at the point of divorce as in the case of many US
states, or of individually owned property that may be reassigned at divorce to meet housing needs
or so forth, e.g. in the case of England (but not Scotland). The general move seems to be in the
direction of introducing community  property backed up by legally enforceable prenuptial
agreements (Dnes [1998]).
Dividing  the assets of a marriage at divorce is a question of defining property rights or possibly of
resolving  conflict over property rights. Earlier work in the economics of law has generated several
insights into sensible ways to settle conflict over property rights. Such conflicts  frequently occur
in cases of nuisance, which are usually characterized by ill-defined entitlement to make a particular
use of land. The area is a long way from marriage but the principles may be borrowed as it turns
out there is little logical difference  between conflict over use and conflict over ownership.
According to Calabresi and Melamed (1972) conflict over property rights can be solved by
adopting either a 'property' or a 'liability'  rule depending on the bargaining costs likely to arise
between the parties. Thus, in a simple case of nuisance spilling over between two neighbouring
landowners a property rule may be followed because bargaining costs are likely  to be low as there
are just two parties involved.
Under a property rule, the entitlement to create the nuisance can, as one possible solution, safely
be given  to the neighbour generating the nuisance. If the 'victim' values freedom from the nuisance
more than the 'generating' neighbour values the entitlement to create the nuisance, money will
12change hands as the victim will bribe the generator to stop. Thus, the 'entitlement' will end up in
the ownership of the hands of the neighbour who values it most highly.
It is equally efficient for the entitlement to be given to the victim, who would then obtain an
injunction stopping the nuisance. If the generator of the nuisance is the highest valuing party,
money will again change hands and the generator will effectively  bribe the victim to condemn the
injunction. With low bargaining costs, from the point of view of economic efficiency,  it does not
matter who has the entitlement (an application of the Coase [1960] theorem) as bargaining will
ensure that the entitlement goes to the highest valuing user. Therefore, the courts can avoid costly
determination of issues in such cases by issuing or denying an injunction depending on their views
of distributing benefits between the parties, secure in the knowledge that bargaining will take care
of efficiency. For completeness at this point, note that it would be worth while for courts to
follow a liability  rule and become involved in valuing nuisance and imposing damages to create a
deterrent to the nuisance where bargaining costs are high: typically when damages are diffused
across populations.
In the case of ancillary relief, the problem is not nuisance but, rather, one of determining  who
owns what from the point of divorce onwards. Marriage is clearly a case where bargaining costs
are low in that two people are involved who can be expected to communicate, at least in a
technical sense. Thus, a property rule, in the sense of Calabresi and Melamed (1972), should be
appropriate. It should be possible to choose a simple guideline  for property division upon divorce
and then rely on marrying couples to form their precise marital expectations based on the
existence of that rule. In a sense, it should not matter much what exactly the rule is as the
important point is simply to give some focus to bargaining.
One could as easily start from a presumption that divorcees will split marital assets equally as
fr--  a different assumption. Presumptions that assets might be split in other proportions would
ne  .,ause problems. Knowing what the rebuttable presumption is (e.g. take an extreme case like
100 per cent to one party) a couple would negotiate a pre-nuptial agreement to produce the
division (e.g. equal shares) they actually wanted. Negotiation would be straightforward: the
parties would agree what would happen in the event of divorce at the time they agreed to marry.
As long as the presumptive rule were well known in advance of marriage and people were free to
negotiate enforceable contracts around it, bargaining should result in optimization for individual
cases. Bargaining can yield whatever the parties require regardless of the presumptive rule: it does
not much matter whether 10 per cent is agreed to be added to 30 per cent, or 10 per cent is
subtracted from 50 per cent, as the result is a 40 per cent share.
There will be no wealth effects, and consequently no labour-market effects, from choosing a
particular rule for dividing marital property. The Coase theorem tells us that couples will  bargain
around the norm and it will anyway be understood from the start of marriage. However, this is not
the case if the property-rights system is suddenly changed retroactively, which may well be the
case when systems of marital property are reformed. In a developing country, there may suddenly
be introduced a system of property rights for married women when this previously did not exist.
In such cases, there will be wealth effects as women unexpectedly receive title to property on
divorce. Their labour market decisions  will be affected as a consequence of such changes,  with
13propertied divorced women reducing their labour supply compared with cases where they
received less property. Wealth effects will tend to work like increases in unearned income in terms
of Figure 1.
The above line of reasoning would support the application of new rules to marriages, rather than
divorces, from a certain date onwards. Such a forward-looking approach would allow couples to
find their optimal asset plan knowing exactly  what they must do to achieve this if they do not like
the presumptive rule. There would be no sudden windfalls of wealth likely to distort incentive
structures. This suggestion is completely undermined if the pre-existing system of property
division is totally unacceptable for other reasons (e.g. an absence of any obligation to share tends
to leave women destitute). .
It is worth noting a few more points about the use of a property rule. First, it could operate after a
meeting a maintenance requirement to support children of the marriage, or even to support an ex-
spouse with child-care responsibilities, and retain a neutral effect. As long as fundamental
obligations and the presumptive rule are well understood, individuals  can be expected to negotiate
clear agreements if they wish to establish their preferred rule for division. In fact, needs-based
support obligations would act as a base-line affecting all possible presumptive or privately
negotiated rules. Negotiation could therefore have the character of agreeing asset division  (and
possibly maintenance payments) over and above certain needs-based support payments (e.g. CSA
obligations) that all parties realize will be enforced anyway. Again, the key thing is that such
obligations be widely understood.
Secondly, the clarification of marital property rights can be contrasted with the uncertain position
that often precedes such legal reform. Wide discretion practiced in the divorce courts can impart
considerable uncertainty, which can give tremendous scope for (possibly opportunistic) argument
at the point of divorce, when everything is 'up for grabs'. This may render marriage a far less
reliable institution and affect women's work preferences, as they may feel a need to insure
themselves against uncertain marital benefits.
4.  MOVES TOWARDS PENSION SPLITTING
The final area of legislative change towards marriage to be considered in terms of its impact on
female labour supply is pension reform.  The specific policy to be considered is pension splitting at
the point of divorce. Pension splitting rules exist, for example, in the United States of America,
the United Kingdom, and in continental European jurisdictions. It is a reasonable judgement that
this type of innovation will spread around the world in the near future. One of the benefits of
working is the pension rights attached to a job,  as these reflect deferred income. Therefore,
individual pension entitlements arising in marriage will affect the desirability of work for women,
following the kind of individual-bargaining  model of marriage that has been used throughout this
paper. In terms of Figure 1., transfers of pension rights increase expected unearned income for the
recipient.
Recent reforms in England (and Wales) give a useful idea of the nature of pension splitting.  Until
1995, settlements over pensions were governed by The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as
amended by The Matrimonial and Family  Proceedings Act 1984. Courts could take pensions into
14consideration when transferring assets between former spouses in accordance with the legislative
intention of, in particular, meeting needs. Typically,  the court, as part of assessing the benefits lost
by the divorcing parties, would consider whether it should compensate an abandoned, or
abandoning, wife for the loss of her former husband's  pension. A wife who had become dependent
on her husband would most likely not have taken out a pension in her own name but would
anticipate sharing her husband's. In principle, genders could be reversed in cases where a
divorcing husband had become dependent on his former wife. On the old law, all private and state
pensions could be taken into account if they were a foreseeable benefit, i.e. if they were to
become active within a time horizon of four to 10 years. The problem over foreseeability, i.e. its
short lead time in the law, reflected judicial incapacity or unwillingness  to deal with uncertainty.
In work for the Department of Social Security, Prior and Field [1996] reported that
approximately 70 per cent of divorcing couples had private-pension rights that were sufficiently
valuable to be contentious. Few of the women interviewed thought that pension rights had been
taken into account in their divorce settlements, although this conflicted with the evidence of
solicitors, who reported that pensions were taken into account in 70 per cent of cases involving
pension rights. One would expect the solicitors  to be correct in their perceptions, with it possibly
being the case that methods of constructing divorce settlements masked the role of pensions. The
figure of 45 per cent reported for divorced women who were satisfied with their settlements
(compared with 30 per cent who were dissatisfied)  reinforces that conclusion (the natural bias in
answering such a question would favour dissatisfaction).  Prior and Field report that in the vast
majority of cases, the value of the pension was offset against part of the value of the matrimonial
home in fashioning a settlement. It could also be the subject of an offsetting lump-sum payment.
The Pensions Act 1995 widened the scope for courts to consider pensions at divorce. The Act
removes the reference to 'foreseeable' future income in §25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, which
implies that pensions will be included in more settlements, e.g. where the pension will be paid
outside of an horizon of 10 years. Also, former spouses can apply to the court for an attachment
order, allowing a share of (typically) the husband's pension to be 'earmarked'  for the dependent
former wife. If the former spouse remarries or the husband were to die, the earmarking
attachment order will cease. The attachment powers in the 1995 Act apply  to private, UK based
pension schemes. Finally  in this matter, pension law is amended in relation to such things as
guaranteed minimum  payments to allow schemes  to cope with the possibility of attachment
(henceforth 'earmarking').
The impetus behind the Pensions Act 1995, as far as widening the scope for considering pensions
upon divorce is concerned, comes from problems caused by the move away from life-time support
obligations in marriage and from cases where there are few non-pension assets. If divorcing
husbands (usually) were required to maintain an ex-spouse until one of them died, the issue of
earmarking pensions would not arise as maintenance  payments would continue into retirement
(although, as with earmarking, not beyond the death of the divorced woman). Also, given the
practices of courts in offsetting pensions against other assets, there would be no real reason to
worry about pensions where there were plenty of other assets. Attachment orders are useful as a
means of obtaining a share in the pension, either when it is the only asset in existence or as a
means to prolong support.
15In turn, attachment orders have come to generate a number of concerns. One is that the former
spouse bears risk in that the pension-scheme member (henceforth 'member')  may die or may move
his pension around in a way that reduces the pension. Because of this the Family Law Act 1996
amends the Matrimonial Causes Act to allow for sharing of the pension asset at divorce, i.e. by
reducing the pension rights of the pension-scheme member and creating corresponding new rights
for the other party. The Family  Law Act was passed by the Conservative Government that left
office in 1997. The incoming  Labour Government will  retain the Act and make operational the
section dealing with pension splitting. This is an example of legislation in which a principle was
accepted without a practical guide to carrying it out.  The incoming Secretary of State for Social
Security, Harriet Harman, stated in early 1997 that splitting of pensions at divorce would not be
practical before the year 2000. Nonetheless, it is clearly  the direction of current legislation, and
policy making more generally around the world, and one that has implications for female labour-
supply decisions.
The major difference between earmarking pensions and splitting at divorce is in the implications
for risk bearing.  Under earmarking, the divorced wife of a scheme member must wait until he
retires before she can claim a share of the pension. With splitting, she can claim her own pension
(she cannot usually have the cash in the present) at her own retirement. It is technically possible to
render these two expected values equal by reducing the split amount to take account of its greater
certainty (it has no scheme-member  related risk attached) but courts would never have the
information to do so. Therefore, courts will develop rules of thumb, and, compared with
earmarking, splitting is likely  to give some divorced wives more than the certainty equivalent of
an earmarked amount and give others somewhat less. There will therefore be some distortion of
labour market decisions, with some divorced wives wishing to increase labour supply and others
reduce it relative to the level associated with earmarked pension shares.
The influence of changes in pensions on labour supply arises owing to the fact that pensions are
future income that can be considered as contributing  to a lifetime earnings profile for the worker.
In this case the earnings are (in decision-making terms) unearned, and increases will tend to
reduce the need for earned income whereas decreases will increase the need for earnings.
Even the move to earmarking pensions may have labour-market implications  for women.  It is
tempting to argue that there will be no implications as before divorce, the wife would anyway
have enjoyed a share of her husband's pension rights. Such arguments are not sound given that the
evidence on individual-bargaining  models of marriage suggests it matters who has property rights
in income flows and controls expenditure in marriage (Lundberg et al [1995]; Fortin and Lacroix
[1997]). Thus, a move to earmarking or to any kind of pension rights for divorced women should
act as though it were an increase in unearned income and reduce their labour supply accordingly.
16CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have shown  that current  trends  towards  reforming  marital  law, particularly  with
respect to post-divorce  obligations  will alter women's  incentives  to supply  labour. The move  from
life-time  support  obligations  increases  the need  of women  to work following  divorce  but also
increases  their vulnerability  to divorce, causing  increased  labour supply  as a self-insurance
mechanism.  This claim  can be made in relation  to reliance-based,  restitution-based,  rehabilitative
and needs-driven  standards  of alimony  payments.
Conversely,  reform  of property  division  that favours  women  by introducing  property  interests
where none previously  existed  would tend to reduce  their labour supply  owing  to wealth effects.
The same  may  be said of pension  splitting,  where  pensions  are best viewed  as deferred  income.
On the current  income side,  child-support  obligations  imposed  on males,  if doing  more than
meeting  the bare needs  of child  rearing,  would  act as unearned  income  for, and tend to reduce  the
labour supply  of, female  child-carers.
On one level,  the analysis  above  warns of an unintended  consequence,  in the shape  of deterring
female  labour supply,  of marital  reforms  that are frequently  expected  to benefit  women. It is true
that policies  to enhance  female  labour-market  participation  would need  to be extremely  wary of
some  current trends in marital  law. However,  the non-labour-market  aspects  of these changes  may
be more important.  It is a matter ofjudgement  whether  policy  should  enhance  the marital  rights  of
the current female  population  or insist  on certain  incentives  for labour-market  participation.
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